Advancing Understanding of AI Scientists Through Documentation

In recent years, a number of artificial intelligence (AI) science agents have been developed that could accelerate research cycles and advance beneficial scientific endeavors. However, these AI scientists also present a potential dual-use risk. Bioterrorists that have traditionally been limited by specific expertise, creativity, or other operational challenges may find AI scientists to be an attractive assistant towards acquiring biological weapons (BWs). Similarly, state actors might utilize AI scientists towards the design of enhanced or novel BWs. This report characterizes the emerging risk landscape of AI scientists through a documentation-first approach. We propose a working definition of AI scientists that distinguishes them from general-purpose large language models. We then survey the current landscape of systems across three categories: specialized AI research assistants, fully autonomous AI scientists, and platforms with wet-lab integration. Finally, we present a taxonomy of capability categories along which biosecurity risks should be assessed. Together, this documentation lays the conceptual and empirical groundwork needed to design targeted safeguards for AI scientists and to inform downstream assessment and evaluation work.