Hidden but not Opaque: Representation–Behavior Dissociation in Latent Reasoning Models
Laura Gomezjurado, Christopher Kinoshita, Christopher Kinoshita, Christopher Kinoshita, Joshua Rauvola
Mentored by Uzay Macar
Working report from the SPAR program. May not reflect the authors' current views.
Abstract
Latent reasoning models replace human-readable chain-of-thought with computation in continuous hidden states, removing the token-level artifact mechanistic interpretability usually relies on. We ask whether the resulting hidden states remain interpretable, and whether a more capable latent substrate can be trained. Applying tuned lenses, linear probes, pass-level causal interventions, and same-output probes to released CODI checkpoints and in-house CODI-style Qwen3-4B and COCONUT-style Llama 3.1 8B models, we find three representation–behavior dissociations. (i) Decodable ≠ readable: a tuned lens trained on ordinary text decodes structured content from latent states (top-10 detection ≈22%) where the plain logit lens stays near zero. (ii) Causally loaded ≠ behaviorally useful: pass-level ablations show distributed causal load, yet the latent mechanism loses to the explicit-CoT fallback it displaces (57.3% vs. 74.0%). (iii) Output-equivalent ≠ representation-equivalent: on same-output subsets framing stays decodable (AUC up to 0.965), and a probe trained on neutral states transfers to biased states at AUC 0.976 where the model has output a planted wrong answer. Turning from interpreting latent reasoners to building one, we introduce a control battery—compute-matched baselines, ablation, shuffle/matched-random controls, and a bits-per-byte deployment gate—over roughly eighty post-training recipes and fifty-six from-scratch architectures: the mechanism is real and causal but does not beat a compute-matched baseline, a gap our evidence is consistent with closing at larger scale. Hidden-state monitoring is thus a viable interpretability primitive even while the mechanism underneath remains immature.